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a b s t r a c t
There are two key characteristic of animal and human societies: (1) degree heterogeneity, meaning that
not all individual have the same number of associates; and (2) the interaction topology is not static, i.e.
either individuals interact with different set of individuals at different times of their life, or at least they
have different associations than their parents. Earlier works have shown that population structure is
one of the mechanisms promoting cooperation. However, most studies had assumed that the interaction
network can be described by a regular graph (homogeneous degree distribution). Recently there are an
increasing number of studies employing degree heterogeneous graphs to model interaction topology. But
mostly the interaction topology was assumed to be static. Here we investigate the ﬁxation probability of
the cooperator strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma, when interaction network is a random regular graph,
a random graph or a scale-free graph and the interaction network is allowed to change.
We show that the ﬁxation probability of the cooperator strategy is lowerwhen the interaction topology
is described by a dynamical graph compared to a static graph. Even a limited network dynamics signif-
icantly decreases the ﬁxation probability of cooperation, an effect that is mitigated stronger by degree
heterogeneous networks topology than by a degree homogeneous one. We have also found that from the
considered graph topologies the decrease of ﬁxation probabilities due to graph dynamics is the lowest
on scale-free graphs.
© 2008 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
While cooperative behaviour iswidespread in nature (Dugatkin,
1997), the mechanisms behind its evolution and maintenance are
still not fully explored. Population structure has been proposed
as one of the mechanism promoting cooperation (Nowak, 2006;
Nowak and Sigmund, 2000). Until recently, most studies assumed
that the interaction network can be described by a regular graph,
which is indeed the case if the players are spatially conﬁned.
Ohtsuki et al. (2006) have shown for a number of other interac-
tion topologies that selection favours cooperation (i.e. the ﬁxation
probability of a single cooperator is higher than the ﬁxation prob-
ability of a neutral mutant) in the prisoner’s dilemma game if the
beneﬁt (b) of the altruistic act divided by its cost (c) exceeds the
average number of neighbours (k), that is, if b/c> k. They found this
relation to be approximately valid if they use the so called “death-
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birth” update rule (details see below) in populations of different
structure, in which interaction topology is described variously by
regular, random regular, random, or scale-free graphs. Recently,
Taylor et al. (2007) have proved mathematically that this relation
is approximately valid for bi-transitive graphs. Furthermore similar
relationship can be derived considering inclusive ﬁtness (Lehman
et al., 2007).
Both Ohtsuki et al. (2006) and Taylor and Nowak (2006) have
assumed that the graph is static during evolution. This assumption
implies that a newborn individual (or accepted strategy-by-
imitation) in a given position interacts with exactly the same
individuals that were connected to every preceding individual at
this position. Dispersal from the natal patch (mostly by males) is
widespread in nature. Furthermore animal social structure exhibits
both rapid changes and long term association (e.g. bottlenose dol-
phins (Connor et al., 1999); spermwhales (Whitehead, 1995, 1997);
long-ﬁnned pilot whale (Ottensmeyer and Whitehead, 2003)).
Dynamic social connection is characteristic of ﬁssion–fusion soci-
eties (e.g. chimpanzee (Mitani et al., 2002); spider monkey
(Ramos-Fernández, 2005); onager and Grevy’s zebra (Sundaresan
et al., 2007); African buffalo (Cross et al., 2005); African elephant
(Couzin, 1996)). As social networks are not static, the effect of
assuming static interaction topology clearly needs attention. Par-
0303-2647/$ – see front matter © 2008 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.
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allely, some recent papers studied the evolution of cooperation
on dynamical networks. They either studied the ﬁxation proba-
bility of a single cooperator among defectors in the case when
graph dynamics is much faster than the dynamics of evolution
(Pacheco et al., 2006a), or if the relative speed of graph and evo-
lutionary dynamics were varied systematically they assumed that
cooperators and defectors were in the same fraction initially in the
population (Pacheco et al., 2006b; Santos et al., 2006a).
Here we investigate how sensitive is the ﬁxation probability of
a single cooperator to the network dynamics, if graph dynamics is
slow relative to the evolution.
2. Methods
In order to allowcomparisonweconsidered the samemethodology as inOhtsuki
et al. (2006).Namely, apopulation is consideredwhere the interactionsaredescribed
by a graph that can vary in time. The population of N=1001 individuals consist of
defectors and cooperators. An individual derives its payoff, P from interactions with
adjacent individuals. A cooperator helps all individuals to whom it is connected,
thus it pays a cost (c) for each of its neigbour. Neigbours of a cooperator receive
the beneﬁt (b). Generally, if a cooperator is connected to k other individuals and i
of those are cooperators, then its payoff is bi− ck. A defector does not provide any
help, and therefore has no costs, but it can receive the beneﬁt from neighbouring
cooperators. If a defector is connected to j cooperators, then its payoff is bj. The
ﬁtness of a player is given by ˚ = 1 − w + wP, where w measures the intensity of
the selection. Here we assume weak selection where the payoff is small compared
to the baseline ﬁtness (w  1). Other possibility is to normalize P by the number
of neighbours of the individuals. In this case the beneﬁcial effect of graph degree
heterogeneity disappears (Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Szolnoki et al., 2008).
Following Ohtsuki et al. (2006) we employed a “death-birth” updating scheme,
where at each update a randomly chosen individual dies; and subsequently the
neighbours compete for the empty site in proportion to their ﬁtness. Accordingly,
the probability that neighbour i occupies the emptied site is ˚i/
∑ki
j=1˚j , where
the ﬁtness of all neighbours are summed. Alternatively three other update rules can
be considered, which is called “birth-death”, “imitation” and “pairwise comparison”
(for details see Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006). By using “death-birth”, “imitation” or
“pairwise comparison” rules evolution of the cooperative strategy is probable if b/c
is high enough. However, “birth-death” updating rule has been demonstrated to be
detrimental to the evolution of cooperation very close to the ones gained from awell
mixed population (see e.g. Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006, 2008; Ohtsuki et al., 2007).
We have considered three different graph topologies: random regular graphs,
random graphs and scale-free graphs. In each case the mean connectivity of the
graphs (k) were varied. The graphs were generated as in Ohtsuki et al. (2006),
although there areothermethodsof generating theemployedgraphs, butwewanted
our results to be directly comparable to one of the most eminent prior study in this
ﬁeld. For random regular graphs (RRG), the links between nodes are randomly drawn
under the constraint that every node ends up with an equal number of links, k. In
order to ensure connectedness of the network, every node is ﬁrst linked to a random
node of the already connected ones. Random graphs (RG) are generated in much the
same way as RRG, but relaxing the constraint that every node has the same number
of links to having k links on average. As for RRG, we ﬁrst need to make sure that
the graph is connected. In a second step two randomly drawn nodes are linked. The
second step is repeated until kN links have been distributed. Scale-free networks are
generated according to the method of preferential attachment (Albert and Barabási,
2002).
The interaction network was allowed to change. After each update, ω fraction
of the edges belonging to the site being updated was changed. The edge between
the focal site and a randomly selected neighbour was exchanged with the edge con-
necting a randomly chosen site to its neighbour. For example, if A and B, and C and
D, were originally connected, then after the update, A is connected to C, and B is
connected to D. Because the number of edges belonging to a site never changes, the
edge distribution of the graphs remain unchanged (Farkas et al., 2004; Maslov and
Sneppen, 2002; Xulvi-Brunet et al., 2003).
In numerical simulations, we then measured the ﬁxation probability of a single
cooperator at different levels of graph dynamics (ω), different average numbers of
neighbours (k), and variations in the beneﬁt to cost ratio (b/c). The initial cooperator
was placed in a randomly chosen node. For each parameter combination we have
constructed1000graphs, andoneachgraph thesimulationwas repeated1000 times.
The total number of repetitions (n) was thus one million. We computed the number
of cases (nC)when the single cooperator spreadedandﬁxated in thepopulation. Thus
we estimated the average ﬁxation probability pC =nC/n. Fixation of the cooperative
strategy is supported if thisprobability ishigher than theﬁxationof aneutralmutant,
that is if pC =1/n.
1 Ohtsuki et al. (2006) have also simulated a population of N=500 individuals,
with similar results as for N=100, thus the use of smaller population is justiﬁed.
3. Results
Numerical simulations show that the ﬁxation probability of a
cooperator is clearly lower than in the corresponding static graph
model, even if the graph dynamics are set to be slow (Fig. 1). The
slower the dynamics the bigger the speed of decrease in ﬁxation
probability, indicating the sensitivity the results of Ohtsuki et al.
(2006) to the assumption of static graphs (Fig. 2). For example,
while the b/c> k relation is roughly valid for the static random reg-
ular, and random graphs (Fig. 1a and b), it changes approximately
to b/c> (3/2)k, even if only 10% of the newborn individual’s connec-
tions change randomly (Fig. 1d and e). Interestingly decreasing of
ﬁxationprobabilitieswith increasinggraphdynamics is less intense
if the interaction structure is described by a scale-free graph com-
paring toeither the randomor the randomregular graph (Fig. 1c and
f). Naturally, it remains still valid that increasing b/c and decreasing
k increases the ﬁxation probability of cooperator.
Edge swapping cannot be implemented in regular graphs.
Instead, individuals were exchanged to simulate changes in the
interaction network (which is not edge swapping per se). Here
again, we found that ﬁxation probabilities decreased rapidly with
increasing graph dynamics (data not shown). Thus, changes in the
interaction network have the same qualitative effect as in the other
graphs, even though direct comparison of the regular graph with
the others is not possible.
4. Discussion
We found that dynamics in the interaction network lowers the
ﬁxationprobabilityof the cooperative strategy. It is trivial that in the
limit of very fast network dynamicwe arrive at thewellmixed case,
where defection is the only ESS. This limit could have been reached
in a qualitatively different way. For example ﬁxation probability
drops signiﬁcantly only at very high values of network dynamic, or
it may decrease linearly with increasing network dynamics. These
were found to be not the cases, as even a very small amount of
dynamicdecreasedﬁxationprobability signiﬁcantly. Thus, studying
static graphs might lead us to the conclusion that the evolution of
cooperation is easy. However, it is not the case in the more realistic
setting, where the interaction network is changing, and the linking
dynamic is slow and linking is not preferential.
In our investigation the network dynamics was slow and the
relinking random. The rate of link change was comparable to the
rate of deaths and births of individuals. We employed these slow
rates to show that even this causes signiﬁcant effect. There is evi-
dence that stable association that only change with death and
birth do exist in nature (e.g. Karczmarski et al., 2005). This can
serve as a base line: there is always some topological change in
the interaction network, it cannot be static. Because in most cases
generations are overlapping, parents and offspring cannot have
exactly the same interaction topology, thusgraphdynamic is always
present. And even if generations are non-overlapping the environ-
mental ﬂuctuations and stochastic demography will cause change
in interaction topology. However, we can ask whether frequency
of change in interaction is under evolution? Our results suggest
that having zero graph dynamic is evolutionarily more favourable,
than having any other amount, assuming that graph topology has
not changed and rewiring of graph is random. However, as stated
above, this state cannot be realized. Still, the frequency of inter-
action change is under evolutionarily pressure. However, most of
these pressures are not associated with cooperation. For example
in ﬁssion–fusion societies, interaction network changes, for exam-
ple, because of temporal change of available food (chimpanzees:
Lehmann and Boesch, 2004; Lehmann et al., 2007; African ele-
phants: Wittemeyer et al., 2005; zebras: Rubenstein and Hack,
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Fig. 1. Fixation probabilities of a single cooperator on static graphs (a–c) and on dynamic graphs (d–f), as a function of the beneﬁt-to-cost ratio. Mean number of neighbours
(k) is 4 (open squares), 6 (circles), 8 (ﬁlled squares) or 10 (upward triangles). Graph dynamics in (d)–(f) are set to ω =0.1. The strength of selection is w = 0.01 in all cases.
Fig. 2. Fixation probabilities of a single cooperator on dynamic graphs as a function
of the intensity of graphdynamics. (a) Randomregular graph; (b) randomgraph; and
(c) scale-free graph. Mean number of neighbours (k) is 4 (open squares), 6 (circles),
8 (ﬁlled squares) or 10 (upward triangles). The strength of selection is w = 0.01 and
b/c= k in all cases.
2004). Thus there is selection pressure on the behaviour producing
ﬁssion and the subsequent fusion of the groups.
We employed random relinking in order to focus on the effect
of network change. A behaviour which selectively aborts interac-
tionwith cheaters and/or search the partnership of cooperators can
have positive ﬁtness consequences. Active linking has been shown
to beneﬁt cooperation (Pacheco et al., 2006a), but there are two
effects in play: that of network change, and that of the preferential
choice of individuals to create or to break linkswith others. Herewe
have shown that network dynamic alone is harmful to cooperation,
and thus we infer that active linking can mitigate its effect (this
will be studied in an upcoming paper). The detrimental effect of
randomness in partnership was demonstrated by Vukov and Szabó
(2004) for a spatial PD with voluntary participation (i.e. there is a
third strategy, the loner besides cooperation and defection (Szabó
and Hauert, 2002)). In their model a small fraction of the links in
the regular network is temporarily replaced by random links. They
have found that cooperation decreases with increased randomness
in the system, and even a very small amount (around 8%) of ran-
domization results in loss of the cooperating strategy (Vukov and
Szabó, 2004).
We have shown that from the considered graph topologies the
decrease of ﬁxation probabilities due to graph dynamics is the low-
est on scale-free graphs (Fig. 1). Degree heterogeneity is the highest
on the scale-free graph among the employed graphs, and mean ﬁx-
ation probability at a given b/c is the lowest on such graphs (Fig. 1).
In accordance with the results of Santos and Pacheco (2005), we
have found that ﬁxation probability increased with the degree of
the ﬁrst cooperator node.
Interestingly, a power law distribution was found to describe
human cooperation networks (Barabási, 2002; Ebel et al., 2002;
Smith, 2002). Lusseau (2003) found scale-free behaviour for large
connectivities in a social network of bottlenose dolphins. While
population sizes are usually smaller than required for indicating
a scale-free degree distribution in social associations, some facts
suggest that the structure of animal association network might
resemble these graphs. Associations are not random, and certain
individuals act as hubs for the society. Older females are identiﬁed
as hubs in bottlenose dolphins (Lusseau, 2003) and in African ele-
phants (McComb et al., 2001). It seems that certain pigs are more
Author's personal copy
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“popular” than others (Durell et al., 2004), an observation which
was also made for other domestic animals. Spotted hyenas females
tend to associate more with higher ranking females (Smith et al.,
2007). Degree heterogeneity seems to be common in animal soci-
eties; and it promotes cooperation (Santos et al., 2006b). Here we
have shown that the scale-free network structure buffers the effect
of change in association, which is always present in the network.
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